[1]熊律,王紅,蔣祖華.風險視角下的動車組部件預防性維修博弈優化[J].哈爾濱工程大學學報,2021,42(5):694-702.[doi:10.11990/jheu.201909032]
 XIONG Lü,WANG Hong,JIANG Zuhua.Game optimization of preventive maintenance for electric multiple unit components from the perspective of failure risk[J].Journal of Harbin Engineering University,2021,42(5):694-702.[doi:10.11990/jheu.201909032]
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風險視角下的動車組部件預防性維修博弈優化(/HTML)
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《哈爾濱工程大學學報》[ISSN:1006-6977/CN:61-1281/TN]

卷:
42
期數:
2021年5期
頁碼:
694-702
欄目:
出版日期:
2021-05-05

文章信息/Info

Title:
Game optimization of preventive maintenance for electric multiple unit components from the perspective of failure risk
作者:
熊律12 王紅1 蔣祖華3
1. 蘭州交通大學 機電工程學院, 甘肅 蘭州 730070;
2. 廣東交通職業技術學院 軌道交通學院, 廣東 廣州 510650;
3. 上海交通大學 機械與動力工程學院, 上海 200240
Author(s):
XIONG Lü12 WANG Hong1 JIANG Zuhua3
1. School of Mechanical Engineering, Lanzhou Jiaotong University, Lanzhou 730070, China;
2. School of Rail Traffic, Guangdong Communication Polytechnic, Guangzhou 510650, China;
3. School of Mechanical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China
關鍵詞:
動車組運營方維修方故障風險預防性維修可靠度討價還價博弈
分類號:
U279.1
DOI:
10.11990/jheu.201909032
文獻標志碼:
A
摘要:
為了解決動車組維修過程中故障風險與維修經濟性的博弈問題,以高速鐵路動車組運營方和維修方為博弈參與者,通過對影響部件故障風險的因素進行評分和權重,并使用層次分析法定量評估動車組部件的故障風險。運營方期望動車組部件的故障風險盡可能降低,維修方期望動車組部件的預防性維修成本降低,二者存在一定程度的利益沖突。本文以動車組部件預防性維修可靠度閾值R作為討價還價的對象,分別建立了運營方優先出價和維修方優先出價的三階段討價還價動態博弈模型。實例分析表明:博弈結果更有利于優先出價的一方,并且運營方優先出價的情況下,為了使部件保持較高的可靠度水平,運營方會不惜降低部件的可用度并增加其維修成本率。

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備注/Memo

備注/Memo:
收稿日期:2019-09-09。
基金項目:國家自然科學基金項目(72061022);甘肅省自然科學基金項目(20JR5RA401);廣東省普通高校重點科研平臺項目(2018GkQNCX075,2020GCZX017).
作者簡介:熊律,男,講師,博士研究生;王紅,男,教授,博士生導師.
通訊作者:王紅,E-mail:wh@mail.lzjtu.cn.
更新日期/Last Update: 2021-04-26
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